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NOTES AND COMMENTS
of him and put into the claimant, is anomalous, 17 and that the view
of the instant case in its own jurisdiction is altogether untenable.
In jurisdictions in which it is held that the mortgagee gets legal
title to the land the situation is reversed and, nothing to the contrary
appearing in the mortgage, the mortgagee has the right to sue for
the recovery of the land, whereas the grantee of the mortgagor has
only the right of redemption.' 8 Hence the Georgia view is at least
arguable in such states on the ground that, given the usual elements
of adverse possession, it would be possible for prescription to trans-
fer title from the mortgagee to the claimant. In North Carolina,
which belongs to the "title jurisdiction" category, any such argument
is defeated by the fact that the record is held to be even better than
actual notice.1 9
J. L. CARLTON.
Mortgages: Assumption of the Debt: Defenses.
A mortgaged land to B. C mortgaged other land to D. A's
property was immediately conveyed to X. Co., which was controlled
by A. Pursuant to an agreement between A, acting for X. Co., and
C, each deeded his property to the other. Each assumed the debt
secured by the property conveyed to him. In an action by B against
C on his assumption of the debt, C set up the defense that A had
made no attempt to pay D and, hence, had breached a condition of
the contract which C agreed to pay B. Held, a valid defense.'
It is no longer open to serious doubt that when a purchaser of
the equity of redemption assumes payment of the mortgage debt, the
mortgagee may proceed against him directly; however, the decisions
are in conflict as to the theory under which liability attaches. Some
hold that the purchaser becomes the principal debtor and the grantor
a surety.2 Others allow the mortgagee to recover upon the broad
principle that a promise made by one person to another for the
benefit of a third may be enforced by that third person.3 Formerly
North Carolina did not recognize this latter ground for recovery by
' Templeman & Son v. Kemper, 223 S. W. 293 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920)
(The court says that title is not in issue in a suit to foreclose the mortgage
lien, and hence that title by prescription cannot be set up as a defense.).
Stephenson v. Turlington, 186 N. C. 191, 119 S. E. 210 (1923) ; McINTosH,
NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§161, 211.
" Supra note 10.
1 Land Bank v. Page, 206 N. C. 18 (1934).
'(1932) 11 N. C. L. REv. 96.
'Marble Say. Bank v. Mesarvey, 101 Iowa 285, 70 N. W. 198 (1897).
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the mortgagee,4 but it now sanctions the application of the third party
beneficiary doctrine.5
In those states where the purchaser is treated as being a principal
debtor and the vendor a surety, the tenor of the promise is to in-
demnify the latter in case he has to pay the debt ;G thus it follows
that if the purchaser can show that his grantor had not assumed per-
sonal liability, this constitutes a valid defense to an action on the
debt3 The principal case raised this point without deciding it.8
Where the mortgagee is permitted to sue as a third party beneficiary,
it is generally held that the personal liability of the vendor is imma-
terial,9 although the rule is otherwise in several states. 10 Under either
theory any defense which the purchaser would have against the ven-
dor is available to him in an action by the mortgagee," who derives
his rights solely by virtue of the contract between the purchaser and
vendor.12 It has been held that fraud practiced on the grantee in
persuading him to assume the debt is a valid defense.'8 The same
result has been reached where the assumption clause was inserted in
the deed through a mistake of the scrivner ;14 where the deed failed
to express the terms of the written contract between the purchaser
and his vendor ;15 where the title to land which the grantor deeded
to the purchaser as consideration for the latter's promise proved to
be defective;16 and where, as in the principal case, the vendor failed
to pay a mortgage debt assumed by him.1 It is generally considered
'Woodcock v. Bostic, 118 N. C. 822, 24 S. E. 362 (1896).
'Rector v. Lyda, 180 N. C. 577, 105 S. E. 170 (1920).
'Thacker v. Hubbard & Appleby, 122 Va. 379, 94 S. E. 929 (1918).
'Colorado Say. Bank v. Bales, 101 Kan. 100, 165 Pac. 843 (1917); see
Barber v. Hanie, 163 N. C. 588, 591, 80 S. E. 57 (1913).
0 Supra note 1, at 24.
'Scott v. Wharton, 226 Ala. 601, 148 So. 308 (1933) ; Allen v. Traylor, 212
S. W. 945 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919); Citizens Say. & Loan Soc. v. Chapman, 173
Wash. 515, 24 P. (2d) 63 (1933).
"'Ross v. Davis, 138 Misc. Rep. 863, 248 N. Y. Supp. 441 (1931); Fry v.
Auman, 29 S. D. 30, 135 N. W. 708 (1912).
"Kyner v. Clark, 29 F. (2d) 545 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928).
Shult v. Doyle, 199 Iowa 304, 201 N. W. 787 (1925).
"'Bradbury v. Carter, 291 Fed. 363 (C. C. A. 7th, 1923) ; Tuttle v. Jock-
inus, 111 Conn. 269, 149 AtI. 785 (1930).
"Lloyd v. Lowe, 63 Colo. 294, 165 Pac. 608 (1917) ; Cushing v. Newbern,
75 Okla. 258, 183 Pac. 409 (1919).
Peters v. Goodrich, 192 Iowa 790, 185 N. W. 903, 904 (1921) ("Notwith-
standing the recitals in the warranty deed, it was available to the appellee
(purchaser) to show the true contract between him and his grantor as against
appellant (mortgagee). He could not only show this where said contract was
evidenced in writing but it was available to him to establish by parol the, true
contract between the parties. ... ).
I Ross v. Dexter, 92 Okla. 73, 219 Pac. 689 (1923).
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that a release of the grantee from personal liability by his grantor
without the mortgagee's consent is a valid defense unless the mort-
gagee has accepted the promise before the release.1 s At least two
states have reached an opposite result upon the reasoning that, as the
promise is beneficial to the mortgagee, his immediate acceptance is
presumed. 19
If the purchaser assumes payment of the mortgage debt, subject
expressly to the defenses available to the vendor, he may attack the
validity of that debt in an action by the mortgagee ;20 however he is
ordinarily estopped from availing himself of this type of defense.
2 1
The theory is that as he has been credited with the value of the
mortgage debt upon the purchase price, it would be unfair to permit
him to deny the legality of either the debt or mortgage.22  It is be-
cause of this reasoning that defenses such as usury,2 3 defective
execution of the mortgage,2 4 lack of consideration for the debt, 28
and fraud in procuring the mortgage, 26 are unavailable to the
purchaser.
EMMETT C. WILLIS, JR.
Negligence-Imputed Negligence-Joint Enterprise-Liability of
Passenger in Automobile for Negligence of Driver.
Plaintiff's intestate offered, purely as an accommodation, to drive
a car, which a dealer was repossessing, from a distant part of the
city back to the dealer's garage. While he was being driven to the
location by an employee of the dealer, he was killed when the car in
which he was riding was wrecked in a collision with a bus, caused
by the concurring negligence of the drivers of both vehicles. Suit
against the bus driver who pleads contributory negligence by imputa-
" Hagnan v. Williams, 228 N. W. 811 (S. D. 1930); cf. Holloway v.
Hendrick, 98 N. J. Eq. 713, 129 AtI. 702 (1925) (distinguishable on the grounds
that here the vendor performed his contract although he did so in such a
manner as to warrant a counterclaim had the action been between him and
the purchaser).
Is Thacker v. Hubbard & Appleby, supra note 6.
21 Bay v. Williams, 112 Ill. 91, 1 N. E. 340 (1884) ; Starbird v. Cranston,
24 Colo. 20, 48 Pac. 652 (1897).
0 Erwin v. Morris, 137 N. C. 48, 49 S. E. 53 (1904).
Caldwell v. Comm. Bank of Waynoka, 80 Okla. 11l., 194 Pac. 898 (1921).
2 Chenoweth v. Nat. Building Ass'n., 59 W. Va. 653, 53 S. E. 559 (1906);
Midland Say. & Loan Co. v. Neighbor, 54 Okla. 626, 154 Pac. 506 (1916).
= Caldwell v. Comm. Bank of Waynoka, supra note 21.
24 Hill v. Longe, 95 Vt. 411, 115 Atl. 237 (1921).
Peoples Trust Co. v. Doolittle, 178 App. Div. 802, 165 N. Y. Supp. 813(1917).
Curry v. Lafon, 133 Mo. App. 163, 113 S. W. 246 (1908).
